The Consolidation of Multistate Litigation in State Courts
George T. Conway IM In recent years, multistate litigation 1 has grown spectacularly in both cost and complexity. In particular, the expense of mass tort litigation, which commonly involves dozens of closely related lawsuits brought by citizens of many states, has reached staggering levels.' The cost of litigating these claims often exceeds the sums that are ultimately paid to plaintiffs.' Inefficiencies and costs associated with such multistate, multiparty litigation have inspired proposals for legislative and judicial reforms ranging from suggested changes in the substantive law 4 to calls for more extensive use of joinder or consolidation devices. ' One product of reform that has proven particularly successful is the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. Empowered by 28 U.S.C. § 1407 to transfer related civil actions filed in federal courts to a single district for consolidated proceedings, 6 the Judicial Panel has used its authority both to conserve federal judicial resources and to reduce the danger of unfairly inconsistent adjudication in related multistate, multiparty cases. The ability of the Judicial Panel to foster efficiency and fairness in multistate, multiparty litigation remains limited, however, because the Panel currently lacks the power to remove cases from, and to transfer cases to, state courts. To remove this limitation, this Note proposes that Congress confer upon the Panel discretionary authority to direct litigation to and from state courts. The Note suggests factors that the Panel should consider before ordering consolidation in state courts, and argues that a necessary factor should be a likelihood that, after transfer, the substantive law of the transferee jurisdiction will govern much of the litigation. The Note concludes that a grant to the Panel of power over litigation in state courts would be constitutionally permissible.
I. THE PROBLEM: MULTISTATE CASES IN STATE COURTS

A. Efficiency and Fairness in Multistate Cases
When properly used, joinder or consolidation devices 7 can make multiparty, multistate litigation both fairer and more efficient. Joinder or consolidation can promote efficiency by reducing or eliminating the duplication of effort that inheres in the independent prosecution of parallel claims. For example, both can vastly reduce the cost of litigation by eliminating duplicative discovery and trials, which not only waste scarce judicial resources but also inflict unnecessary inconvenience upon witnesses 6. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1982). 7. Although "consolidation of cases under FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a) is functionally equivalent to joinder of the claims for most purposes," Transgrud, supra note 2, at 785 n.25, consolidation and joinder are distinct concepts. "[Clonsolidation is permitted as a matter of convenience and economy in administration, but [unlike joinder] does not merge the suits into a single cause, or change the rights of the parties, or make those who are parties in one suit parties in another." Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 479, 496-97 (1933) (footnote omitted). Nonetheless, in consolidated mass tort cases, trial courts "often allow litigants to proceed in most significant respects as if the claims were joined." Transgrud, supra note 2, at 785 n.25. Federal trial courts handling consolidated mass tort litigation often permit joint discovery and joint trials of common issues, and may even appoint "lead" counsel to represent groups of claimants. Id.; see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, SECOND § 20.22 (1985) (recommending that courts handling complex cases "select and empower, by court order if necessary, one or more attorneys to act on behalf of other counsel and parties"). and parties. 8 In addition, joinder or consolidation may reduce the expense of litigation by fostering settlements. ' Joinder of related claims or consolidation of related actions promotes fair adjudication by reducing the potential for both conflicting pretrial rulings and inconsistent judgments. 1 0 The danger of inconsistent adjudication is particularly compelling when plaintiff class actions involving similar or identical claims are brought in different courts. Because such parallel class actions can produce conflicting or overlapping class definitions by courts of different jurisdictions, an individual can become a member of two or more class actions that present identical claims. 11 When such an overlap occurs, the individual's claims become subject to an "irrational resolution by a race to judgment." 1 2 Even if absent class members are permitted to "opt out" of any or all of the parallel lawsuits, no guarantee exists that the actions of many individual class members choosing to opt out will resolve the conflict or eliminate the overlap. 3 The problems resulting from competing class actions may best be solved by consolidation of the actions in one court. 
B. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
Within the federal court system, the problems of duplicative litigation can be mitigated by the transfer of related lawsuits under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. 5 Created by Con- 10. See, e.g., Note, supra note 8, at 1144; see also infra note 12. 11. "Among the hypothetical parade of horribles which can be projected is the scenario in which 50 competing, national, multistate opt-out class actions are brought on the same claims and all members remain silent in response to the fifty notices." Kennedy, Class Actions: The Right To Opt Out, 25 ARIZ. L. REv. 3, 81 (1983 8 Transfer of civil actions may be ordered by the Panel either sua sponte or on the motion of any party, and is permitted when (1) "actions involving common questions of fact are pending in different districts"; (2) the transfer "will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses"; and (3) the transfer "will promote the just and efficient conduct" of the litigation. 9 In creating the Panel and setting forth these standards for transfer, Congress sought to promote judicial economy and to minimize the "possibility for conflict and duplication in discovery and other pretrial procedures in related cases." 20 The work of the Judicial Panel has been widely hailed for its success in accomplishing these goals." Multidistrict transfer under section 1407 has promoted judicial economy by facilitating the termination of litigation in transferee courts through settlements and summary judgments. 22 Additionally, the Judicial Panel and transferee courts have used section 1407 in conjunction with statutory provisions on change of venue to consolidate lawsuits for trial as well as for pretrial proceedings. 23 Although consolida- 1407 has a decade of success on which can be built techniques to cope with the problems to be raised by multidistrict antitrust litigation in the next decade."); Weigel, supra note 15, at 585 (multidistrict transfer has "contributed immeasurably to the public welfare and to the capacity of the federal judiciary to carry out its ever increasing burden of litigation"); Comment, supra note 14, at 588, 611 (calling multidistrict transfer "a valuable but incomplete device" and urging that Congress expand Panel's authority by allowing transfer "for purposes of trial. . . without regard to venue"). tion for trial almost certainly defies both the letter of section 140724 and the intent of its drafters, 2 the practice fosters fairness in adjudication by promoting consistent results in related cases. 2 " Consolidation for trial also enhances judicial economy by eliminating the delay and duplication of effort that would result if each transferred case were remanded to its original district for trial. 27 In addition, the transferee judge can take advantage of the expertise she develops in managing the pretrial proceedings to try the transferred cases quickly and effectively. 8
C. Multistate Litigation in State Courts
The Judicial Panel has no power over litigation in state courts, which today manage and adjudicate a large and ever-increasing number of mass tort and other complex, multiparty cases. 29 Many of these cases neither 24 . "Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1982 27. See Note, supra note 15, at 1036 (noting that "trial of complex common issues in one court is frequently practical and efficient," and advocating revision of § 1407 to allow transfer for trial); Comment, supra note 14, at 588, 611 (same).
28.
A particularly dramatic recognition of the importance of this consideration came in Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1971). Pfizer involved 31 civil antitrust actioris for which pretrial proceedings under § 1407(a) were conducted in the Southern District of New York by a district judge who had been sitting by designation under 28 U.S.C. § 292. Because the judge found that he could not remain in New York for the duration of the subsequent trials, he transferred the actions under § 1404(a) to his home district, the District of Minnesota, for trial. Defendants opposing the transfer were denied a writ of mandamus by the Second Circuit, which held that the district judge's action was "fully justified under the circumstances." 447 F.2d at 125. In emphasizing the "unusual circumstances of this case," the appeals court relied upon the district judge's belief "that because of the complexity of these cases the interests of judicial efficiency made it highly desirable that the judge who conducted the pretrial proceedings continue as the trial judge . . . ." Id. 29 171-72 (1984) . The state court settlement provided the involve questions of federal law nor meet the statutory criteria for federal diversity jurisdiction, and thus cannot be heard in a federal court. 3 " Accordingly, related cases filed in courts of different states often cannot be consolidated in any court for either pretrial proceedings or trial, 31 resulting in both waste of judicial resources and potentially inconsistent adjudication.
The inefficiency and inequity of such duplicative litigation in state courts has taken on increased significance in light of the Supreme Court's recent holding in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts," 2 a decision that is likely to increase the amount of multistate, multiparty litigation brought in state courts. Shutts held that in a class action, state courts may assert personal jurisdiction over absent plaintiffs who lack "minimum contacts" with the forum state." 3 "[To bind an absent plaintiff," ruled the Court, a state court need only afford the absent plaintiff "notice," "an opportunity to be heard and participate in the litigation, whether in person or through counsel," "an opportunity to remove himself from the class," and adequate representation. 3 ' By holding that the judgments of state courts may bind class members who lack contacts with the forum, Shutts has removed a substantial barrier to the litigation of nationwide class actions in state courts. 5 As a result, it is quite possible that litigants and courts will more frequently face situations in which related class actions generate conflicts between state courts or between state and federal courts.
To reduce the likelihood that such conflicts will occur, and to extend the benefits of multidistrict transfer to cases brought in state court, some commentators have suggested that Congress grant the federal district basis for a "companion" settlement of related claims in federal court. had gone the other way, it would have largely closed the door to nationwide class actions in state courts by undercutting the ability of plaintiffs' attorneys to put together large classes.' ") (quoting Professor Lea Brilmayer of Yale Law School); see also Kennedy, supra note 32, at 301 (suggesting that Shutts' personal jurisdiction holding was in part intended to "keep small claim consumer cases out of the federal courts" by eliminating "constitutional barriers to the unrestricted maintenance of multistate class actions in state courts").
courts original and removal jurisdiction over multistate, multiparty cases. 3 " Although such an expansion of federal jurisdiction could promote efficient and consistent adjudication, it could nonetheless produce the undesirable effect of "federalizing" virtually all multistate litigation. 37 State courts can sometimes provide more appropriate and attractive forums for multistate cases than federal courts. For example, a majority of states "now offer class action procedures that, in terms of efficiency and convenience for the class, may equal or excel those . . . available in federal court." ' 38 Moreover, litigation in a state forum is particularly desirable in lawsuits, such as tort cases, that concern fields of law with which state courts are most familiar. 3 9 Litigation in a state court provides additional advantages when the court will be applying its own law. Litigation in a court of the jurisdiction whose law will be applied promotes fairness by eliminating the possibility that a federal court or a court of another state will misapply or misinterpret the controlling law; 40 a plaintiff should not, for example, be left with Finally, the amount-in-controversy requirement for federal diversity jurisdiction may bar some class actions from federal court. See Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973) (each individual claim in federal diversity class action must meet jurisdictional amount-in-controversy requirement).
39. the suspicion that he might have recovered but for one court's error in guessing at how another would have ruled. In addition, efficiency is fostered because the courts that are best able to determine a particular state's law quickly and efficiently are the courts of that state. In a few cases, litigation in a state court applying its own law obviates the need to engage in the expensive and time-consuming process of certifying legal questions from a court of another jurisdiction to the highest court of the state providing the governing law. 4 providing the controlling law reduces uncertainty about legal standards for future behavior by providing a direct opportunity for definitive appellate review.
Furthermore, an expansion of federal jurisdiction to embrace all multistate, multiparty cases involving state law would aggravate the already overburdened condition of the federal courts, a condition that for many years has led prominent jurists to call for the curtailment or elimination of diversity jurisdiction. 42 In addition, the introduction of more questions of state law into federal court could only serve to distract the federal judiciary from the achievement of its central purpose-the interpretation and enforcement of federal law. 4 To maintain a proper balance of authority between the federal and state judiciaries, and to make beneficial use of state judicial procedures and resources, any attempt to expand the availability of consolidated adjudication should seek to strengthen the role of state courts in resolving multistate disputes. Ideally, provisions should be made to permit and encourage consolidation in state courts.
II. CONSOLIDATION IN STATE COURTS: A PROPOSAL
The need to promote consolidation of multistate litigation must be reconciled with the need to preserve the authority of state courts. Striking this balance is indeed difficult, and requires both centralized, federal decisionmaking (to promote consolidation) and federal deference (to allow adjudication in state courts). Congress should provide for consolidated adjudication of multistate cases in state courts by amending 28 U.S.C. § 1407 to allow the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to transfer cases both to and from state courts in much the same manner that the Panel today transfers cases to and from federal courts. 44 Although the technical competence of the federal courts might seem generally to support expanded federal jurisdiction, it must be recognized that this competence stems, in part, from the "relatively small" size of the federal bench. Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1121 (1977) . Indeed, some judges have suggested that overexpansion of the federal judiciary would lead to a decline in its quality, and that its special skills should be reserved for the articulation of federal law. This proposal, however, faces several drawbacks. First, its effectiveness could be severely limited by the refusal of even a small number of states to join the compact. Second, the proposal contemplates that transferred cases would "always" be remanded to their original courts for trial, id. at 979, and thus would not capitalize on the potential benefits of consolidation for trial. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. Third, Schroeder's multistate panel would be hindered by her proposed requirement that it secure the consent of the state to which cases would be transferred before it could order transfer. See id. at 966. Fourth, under Schroeder's proposal, no device would exist for the consolidation of related actions filed in both state and federal court.
45. According to the House report on § 1407, Congress refused to authorize consolidation for trial for four reasons. First, in the electrical equipment antitrust cases, the federal courts had experience only in arranging coordinated pretrial proceedings, and Congress "consider[ed] it desirable to keep [the] legislative proposal within the confines of [this] experience." H.R. REP. No. 1130, supra note 20, at 4. Second, the statute's drafters felt that "it may be impracticable to have all cases in mass litigation tried in one district." Id. Third, the House report noted that parties and witnesses generally preferred trial in the original district. Id. Fourth, the legislators believed that there would be "a need for local discovery proceedings to supplement coordinated discovery proceedings," making remand "desirable." Id.
As one commentator has observed, "the importance of these considerations was probably overestimated by the drafters." Note, supra note 15, at 1036. Experience has shown that "trial of complex issues in one court is frequently practical and efficient." Id.; see also Weigel, supra note 15, at 581-85. Moreover, local discovery has often been unnecessary because multidistrict cases have tended to settle either during pretrial or after trial of common issues. Note, supra note 15, at 1037. Finally, because 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) has been used to consolidate litigation for trial, see supra note 23, plaintiffs' forum choice has in fact not received the protection anticipated by the drafters of § 1407, and thus would not be greatly affected by an amendment of § 1407 to allow consolidation for trial. Such an amendment would allow the Judicial Panel and transferee courts efficiently to perform in one step what in effect is already done in two.
46. Theoretically, consolidation in federal courts of cases initially filed in state courts may occur today in a limited number of cases for which federal removal jurisdiction already exists. The proposal set forth in this Note, however, would greatly expand the potential for such consolidated adjudication in federal court by creating general federal jurisdiction over multistate, multiparty cases that may be exercised by federal courts at the discretion of the Judicial Panel. 
A. Standards for Removal
In setting standards for the removal of cases from state courts for transfer elsewhere, Congress should instruct the Judicial Panel to weigh the same factors that the Panel considers today in transferring cases among the federal district courts. These factors include the extent to which the various lawsuits share factual 47 and legal"' questions; the location of witnesses and parties; 4 ' 9 the extent to which any of the actions have reached advanced stages of pretrial; 50 the potential for detriment, financial or otherwise, to a party as a result of transfer; 5 1 and the danger that inconsistent rulings may result if transfer and consolidation are not ordered.
52
B. Consolidation and the Selection of the Transferee Forum
Unlike the removal of litigation from state courts, which occurs thousands of times each year under ordinary removal statutes, 53 the transfer to state courts of litigation originating in federal courts or in the courts of another state could generate friction and conflict between the federal Judicial Panel and transferee state courts. Consolidated multistate litigation can place great burdens on transferee courts, despite the overall savings in time and energy that consolidation may bring. 5 Moreover, state Specifically, transfer to a state court should only occur when it is clearly demonstrated that litigation before the state tribunal would be as fair and efficient as litigation in federal court. The Panel should, for example, be required to give great weight to the state court's caseload. 5 " The Panel should also be required to examine carefully the ability, as demonstrated by past experience 57 or by the existence or absence of efficient state procedural rules, 58 of the state court to handle the litigation.
The Panel should also carefully determine the extent to which state rules of venue, and legislative and constitutional limitations on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by potential transferee state courts, might preclude the consolidation of all related litigation in one state court. The experience of the Panel in ordering transfer among federal trial courts, however, suggests that these limitations will not unduly restrict the power of the Panel to consolidate litigation in state courts. The Panel has shown a strong tendency to transfer litigation under section 1407 to federal districts in which venue and personal jurisdiction requirements are met, so that the transferee district, in turn, may properly use statutory provisions on change of venue to transfer the litigation to itself for trial. 5 9 Because the applicability of rules of venue and personal jurisdiction have not pretoo large and too complex to be processed by a single judge," temporarily assigned a second judge from a distant district court to the transferee district in order to handle some of the cases in the litigation.
55. Cf. Rowe, supra note 43, at 983-84 (noting that although some state court systems lag behind others in matching "interstate and international capability" of federal courts, state courts "could approach" federal court competence through enactment of appropriate legislation). vented the Judicial Panel from facilitating transfer for trial under existing federal procedures, 60 it is unlikely that such rules would significantly hinder consolidation in state court. 6 ' In any event, if complete consolidation in state court is not possible, the Panel may instead order the transfer of all the litigation to an appropriate federal district court. Alternatively, the Panel could transfer as many of the cases as possible to the state court and send the remainder to the federal district court in the district in which the state court sits. 6 " Such a transfer in tandem would allow the state and federal judges informally to coordinate the litigation through, for example, joint pretrial conferences, which state and federal judges have found to be extremely worthwhile. This Note assumes, however, that a transferee state court under an amended § 1407 would remain free to apply its own choice of law rule, and that transfer to the state court will be favored when this choice of law rule dictates that the substantive law of the forum will dominate the litigation after transfer. To the extent that the choice of law in the transferee court differs from the law that would be applied in the transferor court, a change in the outcome of a particular case may be compelled as rule would help to prevent the overburdening of state trial courts by limiting transfer to the cases most appropriately handled by those courts. 6 5 Conflict between state courts and the Judicial Panel would be minimized by this rule because state courts would not have cases based on federal law or the law of another state "forced" upon them by the Panel. 6 Indeed, an option to consolidate in state court would promote cooperation between the federal and state judiciaries 6 7 by giving state courts greater opportunity to refine and apply their own law.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Although this Note's proposal to extend the authority of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation might seem to defy traditional notions of American constitutional federalism, the constitutionality of the proposal can be wholly supported by existing precedent. Indeed, the proposal serves to promote federalistic values by giving state courts an opportunity to remain active in a field that could be wholly preempted by federal law.
A. The Scope of Article III Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
In order for the Judicial Panel to remove multistate, multiparty litigation from state courts, the statutory limits of federal court subject-matter jurisdiction must be expanded to encompass these cases. Legislation broadening the statutory limits of federal jurisdiction has been proposed and considered in the past by scholars," 8 the Justice Department, 69 and the result of transfer. Considerations of efficiency and fairness may nevertheless override any hesitancy of the Panel to order transfer that might exist because of any such potential effect on outcome. Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, for example, similar concerns dictate that "Itihe possibility of a change in substantive law should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substantial weight . . between Citizens of different States . . . and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." 7 2 Although the statute conferring diversity jurisdiction 7 has long been held to require "complete diversity," 74 meaning that "where co-citizens appeared on both sides of a dispute, jurisdiction was lost," 1 5 the Supreme Court has interpreted the diversity clause of article III as requiring only "minimal diversity. 77 the Court held that article III "poses no obstacle to the legislative extension of federal jurisdiction, founded on diversity, so long as any two adverse parties are not co-citizens." '7' Congress could thus extend federal jurisdiction over a large number of multistate cases by providing for federal subject-matter jurisdiction in cases of minimal diversity in which a threshold number of claimants alleges damages exceeding certain monetary amounts. 2.
"Federal Question" Jurisdiction
Alternatively, the federal courts could be given "federal question" jurisdiction over multistate, multiparty cases. Article III extends federal judicial power "to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under. . . the Laws of the United States." 80 The words "arising under," and the scope of fed-eral question jurisdiction, have traditionally been interpreted very broadly. Indeed, so potentially expansive is federal question jurisdiction that the Court has not yet ruled out the validity of theories of "protective jurisdiction.""' These theories, in various forms, assert that the applicable federal law under which a case "arises" could be a purely jurisdictional statute providing a federal forum for the application of state law in a field in which Congress could (but does not) enact preemptive substantive legislation. 8 2 The Supreme Court's approval of laws granting bankruptcy trustees the right to sue on state claims in federal district courts 8 3 suggests that the federal courts could, given the proper statutory authority, assert federal question jurisdiction over multistate, multiparty cases based on the commerce power and an assertion of protective jurisdiction. 4 Federal jurisdiction over multistate cases need not, however, be premised on protective jurisdiction, the constitutionality of which has long stimulated sharp disagreement among both judges and scholars. dicial Panel not only to assert jurisdiction, but also to apply federal standards governing the selection of transferee courts, federal question jurisdiction could constitutionally be asserted over the multistate cases that would be removed from state courts. 88 Verlinden concerned the question of whether the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976"' (FSIA) could constitutionally authorize a foreign plaintiff to sue a foreign state in federal court on a nonfederal cause of action. Specifically, the litigation arose from a contract for the purchase of cement between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Verlinden B.V., a Dutch corporation with its principal offices in Amsterdam. 9 0 After the Central Bank of Nigeria, an instrumentality of the Federal Republic, unilaterally directed its banks to amend the letter of credit issued in connection with the contract, Verlinden brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging that the Bank's actions constituted an anticipatory breach of the letter of credit. 91 In support of its claim, Verlinden argued that subject-matter jurisdiction existed under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which governs assertions of sovereign immunity by foreign states, 9 and which provides that "[tihe district courts shall have original jurisdiction . . . of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state. . .[that] is not entitled to immunity either under [the FSIA] or under any applicable international agreement." 93 The district court dismissed Verlinden's complaint, and held that the Bank was entitled to sovereign immunity. 4 The Second Circuit affirmed on different grounds, however, and without addressing the question of whether sovereign immunity existed under the statute, 5 held that neither the diversity clause 98 nor the "arising under" clause of article III was broad enough to authorize jurisdiction over an action brought by a foreign plaintiff against a foreign state when no federal rule of decision governed the claim. 96. Although article III provides for subject-matter jurisdiction over suits "between a State, the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects," U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, it "nowhere mentions a case between two aliens." 647 F.2d at 325.
97. 647 F.2d at 325-30. The Second Circuit noted that the parties had agreed that Verlinden's claim for the breach of the letter of credit was governed by either the Uniform Customs and Practice The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that "a suit against a foreign state under [the FSIA] necessarily raises questions of substantive federal law at the very outset" of the litigation, and "hence clearly 'arises under' federal law, as that term is used in Art[icle] III."" 9 The Court distinguished language in prior cases suggesting that a jurisdictional statute could never constitute the federal law under which a case "arises,"
noting that "the statutes at issue in these . . . cases sought to do nothing more than grant jurisdiction over a particular class of cases." 99 The Court emphasized that the FSIA, in contrast, not only conferred jurisdiction, but also, by "comprehensively regulating the amenability of foreign nations to suit in the United States," 1 00 constituted an exercise of article I powers over foreign commerce and foreign affairs.' 0 1
Like the FSIA, the proposal set forth in this Note would require a federal court to apply "substantive federal law"-specifically, the standards for transfer and consolidation set forth by an amended section 1407 and by interpretive case law. Legislation expanding the authority of the Judicial Panel would act as far more than a jurisdictional grant;" 0 2 it would, like the FSIA, constitute an exercise of article I power through a scheme of regulation as "detailed" and "comprehensive[]' 0 3 as the inquiry governing sovereign immunity. An amended section 1407, moreover, could not seriously be challenged on the ground that it exceeds the delegated powers of Congress under article I. It is well-settled law that Congress may regulate any activity, however local in nature, if it rationally finds that the activity affects interstate or foreign commerce in any discernible way.' 0 4 The extraordinary expense of multistate litigation today "0 5 would amply justify a finding by Congress that such litigation af-fects interstate commerce. 10 6 Federal legislation designed to curtail the waste resulting from duplicative litigation in state and federal courts would thus fall within the constitutional scope of the commerce power. Thus, under Verlinden, the application of an amended section 1407 would constitutionally suffice to support the exercise of federal question jurisdiction.
B. The Tenth Amendment and Federal Structure
The legislative proposal set forth in this Note would not violate any constitutional limitations that the Tenth Amendment or federal structure may impose upon the power of the national government. The Supreme Court has recently abandoned the short-lived doctrine of National League of Cities v. Usery, 10 7 under which the Tenth Amendment had been interpreted as prohibiting Congress from exercising its power over commerce in a fashion that would "directly impair" a state's ability to "structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions." ' 8 In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,°9 the Court overruled National League of Cities and held that Congress could constitutionally impose the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act upon state and local governments. Observing that the "principal and basic limit[s] on the federal commerce power . . . [are] the built-in restraints that our system provides through state participation in federal governmental action," 1 10 the Court rejected the "judicially created limitations on federal power"' adopted in National League of Cities. The Court concluded that "[a]ny substantive restraint on the exercise of Commerce Clause powers must find its justification in the procedural nature of this basic limitation, and . . . must be tailored to compensate for possible failings in the national political process." ' 2 Should Garcia remain the law, 1 ' any grant to the Judicial Panel of authority over state courts would not implicate this federalistic limitation on congressional power, be-cause such a grant would affect only state judiciaries, and would not in any way impair the ability of the states to influence the national political process. 20 Similarly, a state court could not constitutionally refuse to hear a state law claim transferred to it by the Judicial Panel because such a claim could be viewed as a federal claim that is analogous to, and involves the application of, state law. 1 The Court's decision in Testa recently received an expansive affirmation in FERC v. Mississippi, 22 in which the Court rejected an attack on what it conceded to be an "intrusive" legislative scheme designed to enable "the Federal Government . . . to use state regulatory machinery to advance federal goals." a 2 3 FERC involved a constitutional challenge brought by Mississippi authorities to provisions of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978124 (PURPA), through which Congress sought to encourage the conservation of oil and natural gas by electric utilities. Relying on Testa, the Court in FERC upheld a provision of PURPA requiring certain quasi-judicial state regulatory agencies to adjudicate disputes arising under the Act or under implementing regulations promulgated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 125 In addition, the Court upheld provisions of PURPA that required state regulatory commissions to consider, under federally prescribed procedures, the adoption of an extensive array of regulatory standards set forth in the statute and designed to promote the efficient use of energy resources. 2 ' Interpreting the Testa decision as "reveal[ing] that the Federal Government has some" power to enlist a branch of state government-there the judiciary-to further federal ends,"' 2 7 the Court held that PURPA's requirement that states consider the adoption of federal standards did not violate the Constitution because the federal law did not "'directly compelfl' the States to enact a legislative program.""' The Court emphasized that PURPA neither "threaten[ed] the States' 'separate and independent existence' ",129 nor "impair[ed] the ability of the States 'to function effectively in a federal system,' "130 but instead "offered the States a vehicle for remaining active"'' in an area that could be wholly preempted by federal law.
FERC strongly supports the constitutionality of a system of federally coordinated transfers of multistate litigation to state courts, and suggests that such a system would even survive an attack under National League of Cities. 3 2 Like PURPA, this Note's proposal would not "directly compel" states to enact legislation of any sort. The proposal set forth in this 
132.
See supra note 113. Nevertheless, because the majority in FERC later became the majority in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985) , any future abandonment of Garcia would cast doubt upon the precedential value of FERC's approval of the provisions in PURPA governing mandatory consideration of regulatory standards by the states. In any event, the demise of Garcia would not likely disturb Testa, see supra note 125, and would thus leave an ample basis for the constitutional defense of the proposal set forth in this Note. See supra notes 115-21 and accompanying text.
Note would neither threaten "the States' 'separate and independent existence'" nor in any way "directly impair" the ability of states to "structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions." 1 ' In particular, the Judicial Panel would be required to refrain from exercising its authority in a fashion that would unduly burden individual state courts."" Moreover, in the aggregate, the proposal would not unduly burden state judiciaries because the number of cases that would be assigned to state courts by the Judicial Panel would represent only a tiny fraction of the overall workload of state judiciaries. Indeed, it is widely believed that even a substantial curtailment of diversity jurisdiction would only minimally enlarge state court caseloads.
13 5 Because complex multidistrict litigation accounts for only a small portion of diversity cases, 136 consolidation of such litigation in state courts could not on the whole greatly burden state judiciaries. The proposal set forth in this Note would enhance rather than impair the authority of the states. By guaranteeing state courts a role in the adjudication of multistate, multiparty disputes, the proposal would "offer the States a vehicle for remaining active in an area of overriding concern." ' Indeed, the policies reflected in the proposal resemble the values motivating the judicially created abstention doctrines, which have become an important part of the legal landscape of federalism. For example, under the abstention doctrine set forth in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 3 9 the Supreme Court has permitted federal district courts to dismiss federal suits in deference to state proceedings when such a dismissal would promote judicial economy. Specifically, the Court in Colorado River, affirming the dismissal of a lawsuit brought by the United States against more than 1,000 defendants, stated that considerations of "wise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation," could, under some circumstances, "permit[] the dismissal of a federal suit due to the presence of a concurrent state proceeding." ' 14 In determining whether dismissal is warranted, a district court may consider "such factors as the inconvenience of the federal forum, . . the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation," 14 1 and the involvement of rights determined by state law.
142
Colorado River reflects a recognition by the Supreme Court that, in cases in which rights determined by state law are at stake, consolidated adjudication in state court may be preferable to parallel litigation in state and federal courts. The Court's willingness in Colorado River to allow in effect a substantial transfer of litigation from a federal to a state court-without any mention of possible administrative burdens that the state court might suffer as the result of abstention-suggests that the Court assumed that the federalistic benefits of having a state court adjudicate state-created rights outweighed any such administrative burdens. Similarly, any burden that might result from the proposal set forth in this Note would be justified by the fact that the added burden faced by state courts would be that of interpreting and administering their own law.
IV. CONCLUSION
By expanding the power of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to permit the Panel to transfer cases both to and from state courts, Congress could substantially limit the potential for inefficient and inconsistent adjudication in complex multistate litigation. Moreover, through the selective use of the power to direct the consolidation of multistate litigation in state courts, the Panel could foster the growth and development of state law, while enabling more federal judicial resources to be devoted to the articulation and enforcement of federal law. Extension of the Judicial Panel's authority would thus promote the development of a more efficient and more specialized judicial structure that would be better suited to meet the nation's needs. 
